Questions concerning the self have long troubled philosophers. Philosophers of mind and language, for example, have often thought there is something peculiar about our ability to refer to and think about ourselves, which requires explanation; for, unlike our reference to other items, such thought and reference seems guaranteed to hit its target. Epistemologists have wondered how it is that we can know about our own attitudes or states of mind, and how it seems we can do so independently of any observation or inference. Metaphysicians have in turn wondered what the self is; what makes for one such entity, or ‘person’, that can be re-identified as the same over time. And it has seemed to many philosophers that we will not be able to address any one set of these issues without addressing the others. Thinking about the self, it seems, requires a systematic understanding of subjectivity as such. In this summer school, we will consider these and related questions. The summer school consists of a series of workshops, accompanied by keynote lectures.