Logical laws are typically conceived as being necessary. But in virtue of what is this the case? That is, what are the grounds of logical necessity? In this paper, I examine four different answers to this question in terms of: truth-conditions, invariance of truth-values under different interpretations, possible worlds, and brute facts. I ultimately find all of them wanting. I conclude that an alternative conception of logic that dispenses altogetherwith grounds of logical necessity provides a less troublesome alternative. I then indicatesome of the central features of this conception.

Otávio Bueno is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Miami. His research is in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of art. He has published over 200 papers in prominent journals, is the author and editor of several books, and the editor in chief of Synthese.